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A Tribute to Judge Matthew J. Jasen
I.

T

hose who study the New York Court of Appeals could justifiably conclude that Judge Matthew J. Jasen's greatest achievement during the eighteen years he served the court as an associate
judge was one or a combination of the 800 opinions he wrote.
Those opinions have been lauded as models of clarity, style, and
careful thought. And his accumulated work for the court does indeed represent a substantial judicial achievement, of which Judge
Jasen, his former colleagues, and every citizen of our state can be
justly proud.
On the occasion of his retirement, I noted a particular
achievement of which he should also be most proud. He displayed
a very special loyalty to his personal staff, including a succession of
talented law clerks, rotated, according to his policy, every two
years. Their accolades, based on intimate working knowledge and
voiced with genuine sincerity, both to me and to the public, reciprocate that loyalty and speak very eloquently of his services as a
judge of the court of appeals. They have served him well as he has
served the law of this state well.
Judge Jasen has earned and received a proportionate share of
the awards and honors from the legal and academic communities
that go with service on our state's highest court. They will no
doubt be recounted elsewhere in the pages of this tribute in a volume of the law review of his alma mater. From my vantage point
as a colleague on the great court, I can say with certainty that I
was proud to be a part of the court of appeals as an associate
judge and as chief judge during many years of Judge Jasen's service and that I concur in the assessment of Judge Jasen by one of
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Buffalo's leading attorneys who said of him: "After family and
church, the law has been the consuming passion of his life, as a
student, lawyer, and judge."
On behalf of the court of appeals, I thank the Buffalo Law
Review for its rightful recognition of Judge Jasen's important and
lengthy service to the State of New York Court of Appeals.
-HONORABLE

SOL WACHTLER
CHIEF JUDGE

STATE OF NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS

II.
I am honored to join the Buffalo Law Review's tribute to
Matthew J. Jasen-distinguished .jurist and great Americanwho, through a lifetime of tireless effort, has bequeathed us a
great legacy of common sense jurisprudence, appreciation of our
democratic form of government, and concern for basic human
rights.
Because others in this tribute will undoubtedly relate about
Judge Jasen's contributions to the law and his judicial service, I
thought it important to record his early years and times.
Judge Jasen was a young man when I first came to know him
in 1949 during an interview seeking to apprentice with him upon
my graduation from law school. In spite of his relative youth, it
was obvious to me that here was an unusual man of great learning
and intelligence who expressed mature judgment, not only on legal subjects, but, perhaps more importantly, on society and life
generally. I was elated to be asked to join him in the practice of
law and to be exposed to his wisdom and learning.
Enormously self-disciplined, he was possessed of unusual energy and a commitment to excellence. As a trial attorney, he soon
gained recognition as one of the leading attorneys in the county. I
recall vividly the ardor with which he represented his clients.
There was a toughness of scrutiny and perseverance in him, but it
was always marked with grace and fairness.
His practice flourished, requiring additional lawyers and staff
each year and the formation of Jasen, Manz, Johnson and Bayger.
In 1957, he was appointed by Governor Averell Harriman to the
New York State Supreme Court. The following year, he was
elected to a full term, being the first democrat in modern history
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to be elected in this overwhelmingly republican district.
Recognizing his outstanding service as a trial justice, in 1967
all four major political parties nominated him for election to the
court of appeals, where he served with great distinction until his
statutorily mandated retirement on December 31, 1985.
I said at the outset that I would record Judge Jasen's early
years and times, so I take you to the beginning. His parents were
Polish immigrants who came to this country from Kalisz in Russian occupied Poland at the turn of the century to escape Russian
tyranny and to seek liberty and freedom of opportunity in this
country. They were a great influence on the judge. They imbued
him with a strong sense of justice and fairness and with a concern
for people's basic human rights that served him well throughout
his career as a lawyer and judge.
Thus, it is understandable that his service to our country during World War II was marked with courage and distinction. He
served for three years with the Seventh Army in Europe and participated in three major campaigns with a spearhead detachment
as a military government officer, for which he was cited. After the
war ended, he served for a time as President of the United States
Security Review Board for the State of Baden-Wfirttenberg, Germany. In 1946, at the age of 31, he accepted an appointment as
United States Judge for the Third Military Government Judicial
District at Heidelberg, Germany, having civil and criminal jurisdiction over all persons in the American occupied zone of Germany not subject to Military (courts martial) Law.
"It was," as Judge Jasen recalled in his remarks upon retiring
from the court of appeals, "a tremendous challenge -to administer
justice to offenders of American law in that foreign land whose
conception of justice was the ultimate result of a long evaluation
of doctrines raising inhumanity to a level of a principle." Nevertheless, he succeeded in restoring to the German people in his district the rule of justice and equality before the law. Upon his resignation in the fall of 1945 to return to the practice of law in
Buffalo, he was cited for his "high and distinguished service in the
interest of justice."
During my long association with Judge Jasen, I recall many
conversations about his ambitions and thoughts as a young lawyer.
One such conversation stands out vividly in my mind because it
illustrates his strong passion for justice and particularly a sense of

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

injustice that would not allow him to ignore wrongs, whether they
infected the whole social order or merely some unfortunate individual. He told me that when he left law school during the great
depression the thought of someday becoming a judge (let alone a
judge of the New York State Court of Appeals) never passed his
mind. But circumstances and time changed all that.
Towards the end of World War II, he was exposed at
Dachau, Germany to a tragedy of universal implication-the horror of the Holocaust. Never in the history of mankind were so
many innocent men, women, and children singled out for persecution and destruction by one mad man and his followers. This dark
period in human history has never been forgotten by him; it has
been his fervent hope that such a tragedy and miscarriage of justice may never again befall any group, race, or religion.
Being deeply moved by those events, he resolved to do his
part to make sure our government never denied its citizens their
basic human rights by assuring a strong and independent judiciary
to prevent such a human tragedy from occurring here. More importantly, for more than forty years, he has been a human rights
exponent, lecturing before high school, college, and civic groups
about the Holocaust and genocide to advance respect for all people of the world. Recently, the New York State Education Department prepared a two-volume human rights series, "Teaching
About The Holocaust And Genocide," in which extended excerpts from an address delivered by Judge Jasen on the subject
were included as the rationale of the entire published series.
Judge Jasen is also a strong believer in democracy and does
not hesitate to express on every appropriate occasion his great
pride in our country and what it stands for. But he is equally critical of the apathy among many of our citizens who expect to reap
the blessings of freedom and a democratic form of government
without undergoing the fatigue of supporting it. He has truly
been a missionary of democracy and human rights in our country,
not only by his example as a believer and practitioner of justice
and fairness to all who came before him, but also as an influential
member for eighteen years on the premier state appellate court in
the nation.
I salute Matthew J. Jasen, a superb judge who has made significant contributions to the law and to our judicial system. I also
salute him as a concerned and caring human being, whose outspo-
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ken support for democracy and human rights has focused for us a
better understanding of the need to preserve and pass on to the
generations who will follow us the heritage of individual human
freedom and equal justice under law.
This modest tribute to a dear friend and distinguished jurist
concerns only a part of an immensely productive life. There is
every reason to suspect that the years of "retirement"-an obvious misnomer in Judge Jasen's case-will not temper his pursuit
of justice and his dedicated concern for his country and his fellow
man.
-HONORABLE
VICTOR E. MANZ
FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

III.

Judge Matthew J. Jasen and I had not known one another until we ran, I as a republican and he as a democratic nominee, as
candidates for the positions of associate judges of the New York
State Court of Appeals. Thereafter we served together as colleagues from 1968 to the end of 1978, when I retired for age. (I
had served as a member of the court during 1967 by appointment
to fill a vacancy.) Over the years we became and still are close
friends. If these betoken a bias on my part in his favor, so be it.
It is customary these days, to a tiresome degree, and most
often fruitlessly, to classify judges categorically by conclusory and
all too-encompassing labels: conservative-liberal, activist-restrained, pro-this-anti-that and the like. The stretching for facile
labels to achieve the nomenclature but not necessarily the substance of analysis is an obvious temptation. Often a flight from
thinking, it results inevitably in oversimplification and superficiality. Most judges, indeed most people, do not classify so simply.
Certainly, that should be true of persons engaged in an analytical
profession in a very complicated world, and all the more of those
who serve in judicial roles.
So the better approach is to attempt to describe and assess the
whole man, and that also means the whole judge. A prefatory datum is that Judge Jasen and I often disagreed on judicial issues, as
we also often did on non-judicial questions. It is also true that we
often agreed on judicial issues. I am delighted to say that the same
could be said of most of the judges with whom I have served both
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in the appellate division and the court of appeals.
Indeed, the value and purpose of having a collegial court is
that there be the mix of agreement and disagreement among the
members of the court. It explains why, as one examines the levels
of an appellate hierarchy, the several levels have larger numbers
on their panels as the higher stages in the hierarchy are attained,
typically: three, five, seven, and even nine, as in the highest court
of the nation.
It is not good to have too much agreement in a court. It is a
disabling defect to have too much disagreement in a court. It can
even be disastrous.
What is the relevance of this discussion in evaluating the judicial service of Judge Jasen? It is because in his intensity of application in expressing both agreement and disagreement, stubbornly
and vehemently, he made an outstanding and characteristic contribution to the court on which he served. Stubborn and vehement, yes, but confident, firm, and, when appropriate, courageous
in debating his positions. Perhaps, most important, disinterested
but not uninterested, and little influenced by the popularity or unpopularity of the views he propounded.
Of course, Judge Jasen was not perfect. Indeed, a "perfect"
member of a collegial court, if one there could be, would be an
intolerable detriment-anywhere, except in a perfect "other"
world.
The point is that Judge Jasen was a superb member of a collegial court-busy, hard working, and most often dealing with some
of the very difficult juridical questions of its time. His mind and
understanding were always reachable, even if at the inception of
the discussion he and others were at the opposite poles of contention. This condition does not prevail at all times in all courts nor
with all members of a court in any court. But the achievement of
rational resolution of difficult questions and the high quality of
such resolution is the make of a good or a great appellate court.
If these premises be true, then it is also true that Judge Jasen
was an eminently valuable member of his court in the time of his
service. The rational resolution of difficult issues can be discerned
in the several opinions of the court in the same or in compared
cases. Do the opinions of judges in disagreement meet one another or do they bypass one another? Do the opinions evidence
that they have, in meeting, contributed to the resolution of the
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issues? Or do they reveal rancor-manifest, flat rejection of one
another and the contrary views expressed? Do the contrary opinions square off against one another? Or, on the contrary, do the
members of the court, even in their'contrary opinions, reflect the
cross influence of different minds, of different backgrounds, and,
yes, even of different philosophies? In short, does the disagreement display no more than views at sterile loggerheads, or does
the resolution of the issues demonstrate that the process was enhanced by rational and fruitful disagreement?
By all of these tests, the members of the court and the public
whom he served were well served by Judge Jasen. I certainly was,
even when I thought he was wrong and I was right.
-HONORABLE

CHARLES

D.

BREITEL

CHIEF JUDGE, RETIRED
STATE OF NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS

IV.

It was my privilege to serve with Matt Jasen during the entire
twelve years that I sat on the court of appeals; he was a member
of the court before I came and for one year after I left. During
that period he was a capital colleague.
I have never troubled to tally the instances in which we
agreed. We were of the same view as to the proper disposition in
many cases, either as members of the majority or as codissenters.
In other cases we found ourselves in disagreement. Our shared
views were the product of shared conviction as to the pertinent
law and its application in the particular instance. There were
never alliances of bargained accommodation on the court. Judge
Jasen did not hesitate to speak forthrightly in conference and was
consistently articulate and forceful in his writings. Perhaps more
than any other judge on the court, he was reluctant, if he differed
with the majority, to let his difference pass unwritten. His views
were strongly stated in terms of deeply held principle, both of legal theory and of societal values. He regularly lifted up what he
perceived to be the controlling principle and obliged the other
members of the court to confront and publicly address his
concern.

I am too close, both to Matt as a person and to the work of
the court during the years we were together, to assay an evalua-
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tion of the contributions that he made to the fabric of the law in
various fields. That must be left to legal scholars and to the assessment of history.
I am confident, without waiting, however, to identify his significant contributions in expanding recognition of the standing of
litigants to submit their contentions and disputes to judicial resolution, in developing the concepts of judicial regulation of land
use, and in accepting judicial responsibility to mold and accommodate legal principles to the dynamics of society without delay
awaiting legislative action. In the formulation and application of
the criminal law, Judge Jasen was a great articulator of the interests of the victims of crimes and of society as a whole.
Judge Jasen was a great companion, utterly fair, insistent on
the merit of his own views but never belligerent or combative for
the sake of combat. It was a privilege and a pleasure to have
served on the court when he was one of its members.
-HONORABLE

HUGH

R. JONES

ASSOCIATE JUDGE, RETIRED

STATE OF NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS

V.

A great deal has happened since 20 N.Y.2d (1968) was bound
and catalogued. The ensuing volumes have brought us to the present, and at 67 N.Y.2d (1985), it seems almost like middle age.
Within the span, there is a vast body of decisional law and the
abiding, forty-seven-volume presence of Judge Matthew J. Jasen,
who retired from the New York Court of Appeals on December
31, 1985.
An author of almost 800 decisions covering eighteen years
and forty-seven volumes has no place to hide amid those dark
green books. But Judge Jasen was never one to hide, either by
hedging or by throwing in with increasingly disparate majorities.
There are, of course, landmark decisions which bear his name. He
wrote for the court in prohibiting the use of polygraph evidence
at trials' and in sustaining the constitutionality of imposing criminal penalties against narcotics addicts. He afforded a qualified
1. People v.-Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969).
2. People v. Davis, 33 N.Y.2d 221, 306 N.E,2d 787, 351 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1973), cert.
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privilege, denying absolute immunity for libel, to those who furnish communications to the district attorney.' He rejected the
concept of an action brought for "wrongful life, ' 4 repudiated the
adoption of one homosexual by another,5 enforced the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in cases of joint
representation, 6 and established requisites for guilty pleas. He
sustained the concept of affirmative defenses in criminal cases.,
He defined the "threshold" in no-fault cases.9 Because they established law, these cases will spawn dozens of references in Shepard's. They will be cited as dispositive one-liners for years to
come.10

In other instances, Judge Jasen showed a practical, refreshing
approach. Many of us have witnessed the pall that pervaded a
courtroom when an attorney forgot to include a key component
for a prima facie case in his opening statement. His opponent
would pounce and move to dismiss. Hands were wrung. Why not
let him reopen? Yes, of course, why not, said Judge Jasen. 11 And
why not have the "chain of evidence" go to its weight, rather than
exacting a sometimes fanatical slavishness to unrealistic standards
12
of admissibility.
These decisions, and others of renowned calibre, reveal only
a glimpse of what Judge Jasen embodied. It is in dissent that we
see so much more of him and of his practical, consistent philosophy, as sometimes expressed in lesser cases.
Most of us have never sat on seven-member tribunals of any
sort, but it's one's guess that the sole dissenter's space must be, as
denied, 416 U.S. 973 (1974).
3. Toker v. Pollak, 44 N.Y.2d 211, 376 N.E.2d 163, 405 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1978).
4. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
5. In re Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984).
6. People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975);
People v. Maccrola, 47 N.Y.2d 257, 391 N.E.2d 990, 417 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1979).
7. People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 459 N.E.2d 170, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1983); People v.
Francis, 38 N.Y.2d 150, 341 N.E.2d 540, 379 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1975).
8. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1976),
affd sub noma.Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
9. Licari v. Elliott, 57 N.Y.2d 230, 441 N.E.2d 1088, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982).
10. For example, a future decision might cite Jasen as follows: "The plea allocution
was proper. People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9."
11. People v. Kurtz, 51 N.Y.2d 380, 414 N.E.2d 699, 434 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
12. People v. Julian, 41 N.Y.2d 340, 360 N.E.2d 1310, 392 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1977).
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Damon Runyon might put it, lonelier than somewhat. Yet, the
views expressed by Judge Jasen in his dissents were highly deserving of expression, considering that they often reflected the voice
of the populus.
One of the first cases that comes to mind is People v. Costales.?3 The police, armed with a valid search warrant, arrived to
search an apartment. Costales, a latecomer, who apparently was
jarred by the unexpected presence of the law, threw down his
raincoat, which landed with a thud. The police picked it up and
felt the outline of a gun in the pocket. Costales must have figured
that if he threw the gun on the floor he would not be accountable
for it, even though the cops saw him do it. According to the court
of appeals, he was right, by a six-to-one vote. Judge Jasen was the
one, and it is not telling tales out of school to suppose that a high
proportion of the American population would agree with him. He
was, in this sense, like the Broadway play of some years ago, "A
'
14
Majority of One."
H. Richard Uviller, Columbia Law School professor and constitutional law expert, puts it this way:
Judge Jasen has long occupied the seat of good sense on the state's high
court. His contribution to the Court's literature has been characteristically
clear and intelligible. Though respectful of the court's developed positions,
Judge Jasen's opinions frequently circumnavigate swirling doctrinal currents
that often seem to bedevil others. Judge Jasen, speaking the voice of reason
and ordinary common sense, reassures the rest of us that law in this state is
still in a healthy relationship to life. Moreover, to the extent that his approach contributed to the court's opus, Judge Jasen played a vital part in the
evolutionary process of perpetual redefinition that is our cherished judicial
mode of justice.

If the decisional law, particularly in criminal cases, seems to
have undulated, it was without the subscription of Judge Jasen.
For him, stare decisis was not easily brushed aside, it having been
the basis for his concurrences in sixth amendment cases with
which he plainly disagreed.1 5 Nevertheless, the doctrine could not,
13. 39 N.Y.2d 973, 354 N.E.2d 849, 387 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1976).
14. The dissent foreshadowed later cases which gave recognition to protective frisks.
See, e.g., People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 454, 452 N.E.2d 1224, 465 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1983);
People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 409 N.E.2d 958, 431 N.Y.S.2d 485, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1018 (1980); see also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 697 (1981).
15. See, e.g., People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 491, 348 N.E.2d 894, 903, 384
N.Y.S.2d 419, 427 (1976).
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in his view, be imposed as a barrier to what he regarded as common sense. In People v. Knapp, he wrote in dissent:
I believe that there comes a point at which an appellate court, such as ours,
must recognize that the dictates of common sense and reason must be considered in striking a balance between a suspect's fundamental right to counsel and the fundamental duty of the police to aid persons in trouble, particularly those who may be the victims of violent crimes. A rule that turns
criminals free can be justified by only clear and convincing evidence that its

benefit to society outweighs its cost to society."

This dissent is one of the clearest manifestations of his judicial philosophy, and it is no coincidence that his stirring protest
was prompted in a case in which sixth amendment restrictions
were placed on the police who, with no constitutional exploitation
in mind, were merely trying to locate and rescue a missing person.
It would be a grave mistake to glibly pass off such language as the
incantations of a tough, prosecution-minded judge. We have other
evidence. These are the expressions of a judge aiming to adjust
constitutional doctrines to accommodate crime victims who, in his
view, are sacrificed by extravagant extensions of the Constitution.
The evidence is Judge Jasen's consistent advocacy for victims of
all types, be they crime victims, industrial accident victims, or
children.
No Jasen decision is masked in obfuscation or asphyxiated in
clouds of words. There is only clear thought and expression. The
reader always knows what is at issue and how it is being decided.
His opening paragraphs are elegant in their simplicity of style.
Consider: "This appeal involves a mother's attempt to gain custody of her child since his birth in July, 1980. " 17 Judge Jasen,
writing for the court, first chronicled the birth mother's persistent
attempts to retrieve the child, and then made this observation:
"[P]etitioner's poverty and alienage must not be held against her.
Such socioeconomic factors, unless sufficient to establish neglect
or unfitness of the parent under the specific circumstances of a
particular case, are irrelevant and impermissible considerations.""" Custody was awarded to the birth mother.
16. 57 N.Y.2d 161, 177, 441 N.E.2d 1057, 1063, 455 N.Y.S.2d 539, 545 (1982)
Uasen, J., dissenting).
17. In re Adoption of Male Infant L., 61 N.Y.2d 420, 423, 462 N.E.2d 1165, 1166,
474 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448 (1984).
18. Id. at 430, 462 N.E.2d at 1170, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
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In the opening paragraph of In re Aurora Corp. v. Tully, he
orients the reader: "We are asked to decide on this appeal
whether §181 of the Tax Law impermissibly discriminates against
foreign corporations in violation of the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution." '
In O'Toole v. Greenberg, the opening sentence encapsulates the
holding with an admirable economy of words. "A medical malpractice action brought by a husband and wife seeking recovery of
the ordinary costs of raising a healthy, normal child, born after an
unsuccessful birth control operation, does not state a legally cognizable claim. ' 20 If one wants to read on, one may, but many will
have pretty well learned all they need to know.
In Atkins v. Glens Falls City School District, he zeroes in at the
outset: "On this appeal, we are called upon to define the scope of
the duty owed by a proprietor of a baseball field to the spectators
attending its games.''21 The specific point involved was whether
an owner is liable for injuries sustained by a spectator who, while
standing behind a three-foot-high fence along the third-base line,
was struck by a foul ball. Judge Jasen, in exploring the issue, journeyed through sister-state decisions, analyzed the holdings, and
shaped the rule. That the case divided the court, and was concededly close, does not detract from the directness of the holding:
"[I]n the exercise of reasonable care, the proprietor of a ball park
need only provide screening for the area of the field behind home
plate where the danger of being struck by a ball is the greatest. '22
Fifteen years ago, former New York Court of Appeals Judge
Francis Bergan wrote a felicitous little volume titled Opinions and
Briefs,23 a tribute to the writing and style of former Chief Judge
John T. Loughran, who served on the court of appeals from 1935
to 1953 (or, for the citation-minded, roughly from 264 N.Y. to
305 N.Y.). It is good to see that such concerns have been, and
continue to be, important to judges. We speak of tempering justice with mercy, but we are also grateful to the draftsman whose
words are mercifully concentrated. Judge Jasen is such a writer,
and his style has epitomized the gentle admonitions of Judges Ber19. 60 N.Y.2d
20. 64 N.Y.2d
21. 53 N.Y.2d
22. Id. at 331,
23. F. BERGAN,

338, 340, 457 N.E.2d 735, 736, 469 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (1983).
427, 429, 477 N.E.2d 445, 446, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1985).
325, 327, 424 N.E.2d 531, 531, 441 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645-46 (1981).
424 N.E.2d at 533, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
OPINIONS AND BRIEFS-LESSONS FROM LOUGHRAN (1970).

JUDGEMATTHEWJ. JASEN
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gan and Loughran: "One must learn somehow to state the vital
issues simply ....

",24

Judge Jasen introduced his criminal-law decisions with this
quality, whether it was a far-reaching case ("Presented for our determination on this appeal is the question whether the exclusionary rule proscribes the use of evidence at a parole revocation
hearing when such evidence is determined by a court to be the
fruit of an illegal search and seizure."), 15 or one of lesser scope
("The issue on this appeal is whether a rubber boot used to stomp
upon the head of a helpless victim is a dangerous instrument
26
within the meaning of the Penal Law.").
His legal devotion to traditional family life and to children is
a theme that also runs through his negligence decisions, 7 medical
malpractice opinions,2 8 and adoption cases. 29 The theme is consonant with the writings of a judge who is much quicker to establish
a loss of consortium cause of action to the wife of an injured harbor worker 0 than to absolve a carrier from a duty to defend.3,1
In short, the writings of Judge Matthew Jasen represent the
unpretentious espousal of the American ideals that he, as the son
of an immigrant European tailor, has come to cherish and protect.
Those who would destroy or compromise them are on his wrong
side. His is the heart and speech of a humanist who exalts our
liberties and wants to see them intact.
One of his. most eloquent discourses appears not in any New
32
York Report, but in a school text, on the Holocaust.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Piccarillo v. Board of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76, 78, 397 N.E.2d 354, 355, 421
N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (1979).
26. People v. Carter, 53 N.Y.2d 113, 115, 423 N.E.2d 30, 31, 440 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608
(1981).
27. See, e.g., Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583

(1978).
28. See, e.g., Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y.2d 931, 483 N.E.2d 1142, 493 N.Y.S.2d
1010 (1985).
29. See, e.g., Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787,
321 N.Y.S.2d 65, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805 (1971); In re Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233,
471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984); In re Best, 66 N.Y.2d 151, 485 N.E.2d 1010,
495 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1985) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
30. Alvez v. American Export, 46 N.Y.2d 634, 389 N.E.2d 461, 415 N.Y.S.2d 979
(1979), a.ffd, 446 U.S. 274 (1980).
31. Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 64 N.Y.2d 304, 476 N.E.2d 272, 486 N.Y.S.2d
873 (1984).

32.

BUREAU OF CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT, NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., TEACHING
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Perhaps we ought to remember that democracies do not become Nazitype countries in one day. Evil progresses cunningly. One by one, freedoms
are suppressed-first against one group, then another by the method of divide and conquer. .

.

. We should pledge, in the spirit of universal human-

ism, to advance respect for and to observe the basic human rights for all
peoples of the world. By so doing, we show our determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of crimes against humanity.33

It is sad to see one as robust and productive as Judge Jasen
retire from the court of appeals. For an instant, the mandatory
age seventy retirement laws were struck down, until the case
reached the court of appeals and these required departures were
upheld. 3 4 Judge Jasen wrote the opinion, at age sixty-nine.
-HONORABLE

ALBERT M.

ROSENBLATT

STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT

VI.

On December 31, 1985, the judicial service of Matthew J.
Jasen, senior associate judge of the New York State Court of Appeals, drew to a close. Having attained age seventy earlier that
month, the state constitution compelled his retirement after eighteen years on our state's highest court and more than twenty-eight
years as a judge.
Judge Jasen served the people of New York with great distinction as both a trial and appellate jurist. His judicial tenure was
marked by high industry and impeccable integrity, his judicial philosophy by a sage blend of legal scholarship, common sense, and
practical experience. Lawyers and litigants came to know him for
his even demeanor and abiding sense of fairness. He always gave
them his best judgment, striving to do what was right, not what
was expedient. One of the longest serving judges of the court of
appeals in the last half-century, he was a stabilizing link between
the present court and the court of Fuld and Breitel. He will be
missed, but he leaves behind a judicial legacy of more than 800
opinions.
Matthew J. Jasen was born 70 years ago to immigrant parents
(1985).
33. Jasen, Recalling the Holocaust 3-4, in TEACHING ABOUT THE HOLOCAUST AND GENO-

ABOUT THE HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE
CIDE

(1985).

34.

Maresca v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 475 N.E.2d 95, 485 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1984).
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in Buffalo, New York. He worked his way through Canisius College and the University of Buffalo Law School, working full time
as a postal clerk while simultaneously pursuing his legal education.
Admitted to the bar in 1940, he entered the private practice of
law. Following the outbreak of World War II, he attended the
Civil Affairs School of Harvard University, and thereafter served
with the Seventh Army in Europe as a military government officer
attached to a spearhead detachment. In 1946, after serving as
President of the United States Security Review Board for the
State of Baden-Wirttenberg, at age 31, he was appointed United
States Military Government Judge for the Third Judicial District,
Heidelberg by General Lucius D. Clay, Military Governor of Germany. He was the youngest judge then serving in military government in Germany.
A witness to the aftermath of the Holocaust, Judge Jasen was
horrified by the atrocities committed by the Nazis in their persecution of minorities and political dissidents. He was deeply shaken
by the realization that the Nazis had manipulated law to obtain
power and to enforce their edicts, and that the German judiciary
and lawyers had failed to uphold the fundamental law. There, in
post-war Germany, he resolved to devote his life to upholding the
rule of law, not the rule of man, and preserving the civil liberties
and fundamental rights of all the people.
After three years of judicial service in Germany, he returned
to his native Buffalo and established a law firm that quickly became noted as one of Buffalo's leading trial firms. This array of
talent did not go unnoticed; eventually all of the members of that
firm would ascend to the bench.
In 1957, Matthew Jasen was appointed by Governor W. Averell Harriman to fill a vacancy on the New York State Supreme
Court, Eighth Judicial District. He was elected to a full term the
following year, becoming the first democrat elected to the supreme court in that district in almost twenty years. During his ten
year tenure on the supreme court, Judge Jasen authored over 200
published opinions. He was a well-regarded trial justice who
treated lawyers and their clients with thoughtfulness and respect.
He proved that civility and court administration were not mutually exclusive, guiding the matters assigned to him to disposition
without inordinate delay or procrastination. He relished the work
of the special term, enjoying the opportunity to pass upon mo-
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tions that presented interesting questions of the law. During his
tenure on the supreme court, he served for a time as administrative judge for the eighth district, using that opportunity to innovate and modernize calendar procedures to expedite trials and reduce clogged calendars.
In 1967, Judge Jasen and Judge Charles D. Breitel were endorsed by all four major political parties for vacancies on the
court of appeals. The two, who were to serve together on the
court for ten years, developed a close personal and professional
relationship that continues to this day. Charles Breitel became
chief judge in 1974 and was the first chief judge to exercise detailed responsibility for court administration throughout the state.
Judge Jasen, as senior associate judge, was an able right hand, attending administrative board meetings and offering advice and assistance. When Judge Jasen was feted by the Bar Association of
Erie County upon his retirement in December 1985, his friend,
Charles Breitel, retired chief judge, was a featured speaker.
Judge Jasen brought energy, independence, and integrity to
his court of appeals service. Year in and year out, he would be a
leader, and often the leader, in number of opinions authored.
Those opinions are remarkable not just for their quantity but for
their quality. They reflect clarity of thought and lucidity of prose.
Always mindful of the pressures on the trial bench and bar, Judge
Jasen, as his opinions for the court reflect, strove to quickly hone
in on the crux of the appeal, to clearly state the points decided,
and to discuss the practical means by which future cases might be
handled.
As a trademark, the first paragraph of a Jasen opinion invariably would identify the key issues and their resolutions, with the
reader thus able to grasp at a glance the significance of the case.
His opinions for the court stressed the precise issue decided, identified precedent that was not affected by the decision, and warned
the reader as to issues not reached by the court.
The leading opinions authored by Judge Jasen for the court
of appeals span the breadth of the substantive and procedural law
of New York. They include such important issues as: the extent of
an accountant's liability to non-clients;1 the effect of the accept1. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110,
493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985).
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ance under protest of a check offered in full payment of a claim; 2
whether heterosexual or homosexual lovers may form a family relationship through the adoption process; 3whether damages can be
recovered in a medical malpractice action for the birth of a
healthy but unwanted child; 4 the permissible scope of cross-examination of a criminal defendant as to previous criminal acts; 5 the
conflict of interest concerns in situations where criminal defendants are jointly represented by the same attorney;' the admissibility of lie-detector evidence;' and the considerations governing the
validity of exclusionary zoning ordinances.8 These are but a handful of the vital decisions Judge Jasen authored for the court during his court of appeals tenure.
Judge Jasen's judicial philosophy may not be readily characterized by resort to such clumsy and value-laden terms as "liberal," "conservative," "activist," or "strict constructionist."
Rather, his opinions reflect a concern, where the issues involve
common law principles, that the law be based upon an appropriate
and common sense balancing of the rights and interests of all
concerned.
This approach is particularly evident in Jasen opinions on
matters pertaining to criminal law and procedure. In People v.
Moore,9 writing for the court, Judge Jasen sustained the right of a
police officer to search without a warrant the handbag of an emotionally distraught woman who reportedly was carrying a loaded
revolver. He stressed the need to strike a balance between the
need to seize and the invasion that the seizure entails. Likewise, in
People v. Kuhn, 10 in an opinion upholding the constitutionality of
magnetometer searches of prospective airline passengers for
weapons, Judge Jasen held the searches permissible upon a balancing of the danger to the public, the overwhelming governmental
2. Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488
N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1985).
3. In re Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984).
4. O'Toole v. Greenberg, 64 N.Y.2d 427, 477 N.E.2d 445, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1985).
5. People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247 N.E.2d 642, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
6. People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975).
7. People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969).
8. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1975).
9. 32 N.Y.2d 67, 295 N.E.2d 780, 343 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1973).
10. 33 N.Y.2d 203, 306 N.E.2d 777, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1973).
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interest, and the minimal intrusion into personal privacy. In People
v. Nicolletti,11 the failure of the police to seal wiretap recordings
should not have been admitted as evidence against the defendant
because of the grave risks of "diabolical fakery.

' 12

He declined to

sanction unbridled judicial power in criminal cases either. Thus,
3 he authored the opinion for the court dein People v. Douglass,"
claring that trial judges have no inherent authority to dismiss misdemeanor complaints on the grounds of "calendar control" or
"failure to prosecute.

14

The Jasen voice in criminal cases was a voice of reasonableness and balance in a quest for substantial justice. In People v.
Knapp,"5 in dissent, he urged that the "dictates of common sense
and reason must be considered in striking a balance between a
suspect's fundamental right to counsel and the fundamental duty
of the police to aid persons in trouble," and that "[a] rule that
turns criminals free can be justified only by clear and convincing
evidence that its benefit to society outweighs its cost .... ""
Another notable example is People v. Patterson.7 There, the
defendant, relying upon a United States Supreme Court decision
apparently on point,"" urged that New York's affirmative defense
of extreme emotional disturbance, which would allow the defendant the opportunity to reduce a murder to manslaughter, was an
unconstitutional attempt to reduce, if not entirely shift, the burden of proof in criminal cases. Judge Jasen, writing for a four-tothree majority, upheld the conviction, finding that New York's allowance to the defendant of an opportunity to reduce a murder to
manslaughter operated only after the crime had first been proved
and, thus, did not shift the burden of proof. This approach was
reasonable; the legislature had afforded murderers an opportunity
to obtain a reduction in severity of crime by proving a mitigating
circumstance, and, it was feared, requiring the prosecution to disprove the mitigating circumstance in the first instance would lead
11. 34 N.Y.2d 249, 313 N.E.2d 336, 356 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1974).
12. Id. at 253, 313 N.E.2d at 338, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 858 (quoting Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 478 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
13. 60 N.Y.2d 194, 456 N.E.2d 1179, 469 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1983).
14. Id. at 200, 456 N.E.2d at 1181, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
15. 57 N.Y.2d 161, 177, 441 N.E.2d 1057, 1063, 455 N.Y.S.2d 539, 545 (1982).
16. Id., 441 N.E.2d at 1063, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
17. 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1976).
18. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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the legislature to do away with the opportunity for mitigation entirely. While noted commentators predicted that the position
staked out by Judge Jasen would be rejected by the Supreme
Court in view of the sweeping, broad language of its prior precedent, the Jasen opinion was vindicated when the Supreme Court
affirmed, substantially adopting his theory and distinguishing its
prior broad precedent.' 9
The Jasen voice of reason spoke out in favor of the defendant
whose fundamental right had, in his opinion, been violated. In
People v. Murray,20 in a dissent joined by two other judges, he
urged that a defendant could not be properly convicted of a felony murder where the defendant's confession to the underlying
felony had not been properly corroborated. As a matter of fairness to defendants, he maintained that a felony murder conviction
could not stand where there had been no satisfactory proof of the
felony. Similarly, in People v. Miller,21 Judge Jasen, for a unanimous court, held that a defendant, raising self-defense in a murder prosecution, was entitled to have the jury consider proof of
the victim's violent character of which the defendant had
knowledge.
Many of the court of appeals' common law decisions involve
considerations of stare decisis. Well aware that what was proper
and just in one era might be inappropriate and harsh in another,
Judge Jasen was never one who favored a slavish and blind application of older cases. However, as a legal scholar, Judge Jasen also
was cognizant that much could be learned from our legal
forebearers and that, indeed, respect for law and the ability to
guide people in reliance upon settled authority would be diminished if precedents were allowed to shift back and forth, depending upon the idiosyncratic approaches of the seven individuals
who were serving on the court at the times of decision.
A leading example of the application of stare decisis was People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service,2 the socalled Baby Lenore case. Though much popular sentiment was expressed on behalf of the adoptive parents, Judge Jasen, writing for
19. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
20. 40 N.Y.2d 327, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1976).
21. 39 N.Y.2d 543, 349 N.E.2d 841, 384 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1976).
22. 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805
(1971).
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the court, held for the natural mother in a decision based upon
long-standing common law principles. Indeed, the case demonstrated Judge Jasen's commitment to apply the law, unswayed by
the shifting winds of popular opinion.
Judge Jasen consistently urged respect for the limitations imposed upon state and local government by the state constitution.
In Maresca v. Cuomo,2" he authored the opinion sustaining the validity of the state constitutional mandate of compelled judicial retirement at age 70. Though the case did not reach the court until
December 29, 1984, and had to be decided in two days time lest
there be confusion and uncertainty over the terms of offices of the
retired judges and their successors, the Jasen opinion spanned
over ten printed pages and referred to nearly fifty prior cases, legal treatises, and law review articles. In short, a masterful job,
under severe time constraints.
Of course, as is inevitable on a collegial court, there were occasions when Judge Jasen disagreed with the approach taken by a
majority of his colleagues. Unlike some, however, Judge Jasen was
not reluctant to separately-and respectfully-point out that disagreement. Because he chose to state his deeply held views, some
have termed him a "great dissenter." That appellation he should
bear with honor, for it reflects the independence, the courage,
and the strength of character he brought to his judging. In many
instances, his separate views were subsequently vindicated and became the law.
For example, in dissent, in Lutheran Church v. City of New
York,24 he, joined by Chief Judge Breitel, protested the decision of
the majority to permit the destruction of the landmark Morgan
Mansion and firged support for historic preservation. That view
subsequently found expression by the court of appeals and the
United States Supreme Court in the case that preserved Grand
Central Station from material alteration.25 In a concurring opinion in Codling v. Paglia,6 he urged the abandonment of the harsh
contributory negligence principle and the adoption of comparative fault, stating: "[the] notion of fundamental fairness does not
23. 64 N.Y.2d 242, 475 N.E.2d 95, 485 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1984).
24. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
25. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), affig 42 N.Y.2d
324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
26. 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
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require an all-or-nothing rule which exonerates a very negligent
defendant for even the slightest fault of his victim. '2 7 This view
was accepted by the legislature in 1974 by the enactment of CPLR
Article 14-A.
In In re Daniel C.,2 8 Judge Jasen, in dissent, urged that the
rights of natural parents could not be properly terminated
through their consent to an adoption where the consequences of
the consent were not properly explained and the forms were misleading. In In re Sarah K.,2 9 the majority read into the statute and
urged legislative reform precisely along the lines advocated by
Judge Jasen in his Daniel C. dissent. In People v. Ferber,30 Judge
Jasen dissented from the holding that New York's criminal laws
against child pornography were violative of the federal Constitution and was vindicated by the Supreme Court's reversal."
In a steady stream of dissents in his early years on the court
of appeals, Judge Jasen disagreed with decisions overturning administrative discipline and discharge of public employees.3 2 In Pell
3 his view became the law of the state as the
v. Board of Education,"
court of appeals, overturning its prior line of decisions, set forth
revised guidelines for the lower courts in reviewing administrative
discipline of public employees.
Yet another instance where a Jasen dissent was vindicated
came after the judge's retirement from the bench. In People v. P.J.
Video, Inc.,3 4 a six-judge majority of the court of appeals ruled that
the police had failed to show probable cause before obtaining a
warrant to search for and seize what the police asserted were pornographic movies. The majority held the police to a "higher standard" of probable cause because books and movies were involved,
27. Id. at 346, 298 N.E.2d at 631, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
28. 63 N.Y.2d 927, 929, 473 N.E.2d 31, 32, 483 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (1984).
29. 66 N.Y.2d 233, 487 N.E.2d 241, 496 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1985).
30. 52 N.Y.2d 674, 681, 422 N.E.2d 523, 526, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (1981), rev'd
sub nom. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
31. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, on remand sub nom. People v. Ferber, 57 N.Y.
2d 256, 441 N.E.2d 1100, 455 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1982) (statute held not violative of state
constitution).
32. See, e.g., In re Tannenholz v. Waterfront Comm., 30 N.Y.2d 668, 669; 282 N.E.2d
888, 889, 332 N.Y.S.2d 103, 104 (1972); In re Bovino v. Scott, 22 N.Y.2d 214, 217, 239
N.E.2d 888, 889, 292 N.Y.S.2d 408, 411 (1968).
33. 34 N.Y.2d 222, 313 N.E.2d 321, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1974).
34. 65 N.Y.2d 566, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1985), rev'd sub nom. New
York v. PJ. Video, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986).
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as distinguished from weapons or controlled substances .3 Judge
Jasen, "disturbed by the majority's departure from the traditional
principles governing judicial review of a warrant issued upon
probable cause," 8 filed a sole dissent. On April 22, 1986, the
United States Supreme Court, liberally citing and quoting from
the Jasen dissent, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.3 7
The Supreme Court declared that no "higher standard" of review
was required and that, under the "standards of probable cause
used to review warrant applications generally," the warrant had,
as Judge Jasen had previously articulated, been properly issued. 88
Judge Jasen's separate opinions are a testament to his courage, for he did not hesitate to express strong opinions on sensitive
cases. In People v. Mackell, he refused to accede to the majority's
refusal to review, on technical jurisdictional grounds, the reversal
of the criminal conviction of a former district attorney.3" He
urged that the matter be reviewed by the court. Following the
Mackell decision, the relevant criminal procedure law provision
was amended to expand the criminal jurisdiction of the court.' 0 In
another instance, Judge Jasen dissented from the decision sustaining the constitutionality of legislation by which the state made
borrowings in order to advance funds to New York City and its
municipal assistance corporation during the city's fiscal crisis.
Judge Jasen asserted that the legislation violated the state constitutional prohibitions against the loan of state credit to
municipalities. 1
Matthew Jasen is a remarkable man and a truly great judge; a
realist, yet an idealist, a force for justice. His voice and role on the
court was a vital and special one, and one that will be missed. His
wisdom, his spirit, and his courage have greatly enriched our law.
His words, spread out over forty volumes of the official New York
reports, will be permanently preserved to guide future generations of lawyers and judges. While Judge Jasen has retired from
35. Id. at 569-70, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
36. Id. at 579, 483 N.E.2d at 1129, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
37. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986).
38. Id. at 1615.
39. 40 N.Y.2d 59, 65, 351 N.E.2d 684, 688, 386 N.Y.S.2d 37, 40 (1976) (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
40. N.Y. CRIM. PRor. LAW, §450.90 (McKinney 1983), amended by 1979 N.Y. Laws 651.
41. Wein v. State, 39 N.Y.2d 136, 151, 347 N.E.2d 586, 594, 383 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233
(1976).
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judicial service, he has not retired from the law. He will be continuing his distinguished legal career as counsel to the prominent
Buffalo, New York firm of Moot & Sprague.
-ALAN

D.

SCHEINKMAN

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW
ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

-EDWARD

A. SHERIDAN

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND COUNSEL
NEW

YORK

STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES

VII.
Judge Matthew J. Jasen's distinguished judicial career
spanned more than three decades. He served as a United States
military government judge in Heidelberg, Germany, following
World War II, as a justice of the New York State Supreme Court,
Eighth Judicial District from 1957 to 1967, and as a judge of the
New York Court of Appeals from 1967 through 1985. Judge
Jasen authored more than 800 published opinions in his career as
a judge, approximately 650 as a judge on the court of appeals.
During my two year tenure as one of Judge Jasen's law clerks,
I came to respect and admire his ability, courage, and integrity. I
also developed a deep personal affection for the man and an enduring respect for his judicial abilities.
Others have accurately described his capabilities. In their
tribute, two of my fellow law clerks, Professor Alan Scheinkman
and Commissioner Edward Sheridan, have aptly described Judge
Jasen as a man of wisdom, spirit, and courage, as a truly great
judge, a realist, a legal scholar, an idealist, a force for justice, and
a remarkable man. They and others have accurately characterized
his opinions.as masterful and courageous. Chief Judge Wachtler,
in his parting remarks to Judge Jasen on behalf of the Court, described Judge Jasen's opinions as "models of clarity, scholarship
and independence 6f thought."1 I share these thoughts and feelings as do so many others.
While I could devote all of this article and more to describing
Judge Jasen's attributes by relating my personal feelings and ex1. 66 N.Y.2d vii (1985).

24
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periences as one of his law clerks, I have chosen not to do so. This
article will focus instead on a unique aspect of Judge Jasen's tenure at the Court of Appeals-his dissenting opinions. A review of
selected Jasen dissents will not only illustrate the remarkable foresight and ability of the man but also the utility and persuasive
power of the dissenting opinion and the need to encourage judges
to publish dissenting opinions where justice requires.
I have heard Judge Jasen described as a "great dissenter."
This is unquestionably a true statement. However, the greatness
of Judge Jasen's dissenting opinions is not due to their quantity, as
statistics show he generally did not dissent more frequently than
his colleagues, but rather because of the scholarly, insightful, and
powerful way in which his dissents were composed and because of
the effort and courage required to author them.
Available statistics make clear that Judge Jasen was not a prolific dissenter.2 Those same statistics show that he was one of the
leading authors of majority opinions. In each of the eleven of the
fifteen years for which statistics are available, Judge Jasen authored either the most or more majority opinions than all but one
or two of his colleagues. 3 In two of those years, he carried the
2. Individual statistics were available for the time period July 1, 1968 through December 31, 1983. Until July 1974, statistics were recorded on a July through June calendar
year. Thereafter, statistics were kept on a January through December calendar year. See
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
STATE OF N.Y. (1983) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1983]; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLERK OF
THE COURT TO THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF N.Y. (1982) [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT 1982]; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO THE JUDGES OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF N.Y. (1981) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1981]; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF

N.Y.

(1980) [hereinafter ANNUAL

REPORT 1980]; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO
THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF N.Y. (1979) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT

1979];

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF

AP-

PEALS, STATE OF N.Y. (1978) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1978]; and JUDICIAL CONF. ADMIN.
BD., STATE OF N.Y., REPORT (1978) [hereinafter CONE. REPORT 1978]; JUDICIAL CONF. ADMIN.
BD., STATE OF N.Y., REPORT (1977) [hereinafter CONF. REPORT 1977]; JUDICIAL CONF. ADMIN.
BD., STATE OF N.Y., REPORT (1976) [hereinafter CONF. REPORT 1976]; JUDICIAL CONF. ADMIN.
BD., STATE OF N.Y., REPORT (1975) [hereinafter CONF. REPORT 1975]; JUDICIAL CONF. ADMIN.
BD., STATE OF N.Y., REPORT (1974) [hereinafter CONF. REPORT 1974]; JUDICIAL CONF. ADMIN.
BD., STATE OF N.Y., REPORT (1973) [hereinafter CONF. REPORT 1973]; JUDICIAL CONF. ADMIN,
BD., STATE OF N.Y., REPORT (1972) [hereinafter CONF. REPORT 1972]; JUDICIAL CONF. ADMIN,
BD., STATE OF N.Y., REPORT (1971) [hereinafter CONF. REPORT 1971]; JUDICIAL CONF. ADMIN.
BD., STATE OF N.Y., REPORT (1970) [hereinafter CONF. REPORT 1970].
3. ANNUAL REPORT 1983, supra note 2, at 9 app.; ANNUAL REPORT 1981, supra note 2,
at 4 app.; ANNUAL REPORT 1981, supra note 2, at 4 app.; ANNUAL REPORT 1977, supra note
2, at 3 app.; CONF. REPORT 1976, supra note 2, at 46; CONF. REPORT 1975, supra note 2, at
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court more often than any other judge.4 In 1969, he and Judge
Scileppi led the court with twenty-six majority opinions each. In
only one year, his first on the court of appeals, did he author the
fewest majority opinions.5
At the same time, he generally did not dissent more frequently than the other members of the Court. In nine of the fifteen years surveyed, the number of dissenting opinions authored
by Judge Jasen was equaled or surpassed by two or more of his
colleagues.6 In only four of those fifteen years did he author more
dissenting opinions than his colleagues.7 In two of those four
years, he wrote the most majority opinions as well.8
Judge Jasen's dissenting opinions, as well as his majority writings, have become notable for their quality and persuasive effect.
They have been and remain important tools for change and
demonstrate the utility of dissenting opinions generally. Before
analyzing Judge Jasen's dissents in defense of dissenting opinions,
it is necessary to briefly review the criticism and support most
often directed at the published minority view.
undesirable," an
Dissents have been criticized as "useless, ....
''exercise in futility," and a " 'cloud' on the majority decision that
detracts from the legitimacy that the law requires and from the
prestige of the institution that issues the law." 10 The dissent has
been criticized as a device which "'cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so
34; CONF. REPORT 1973, supra note 2, at 65 app.; CONF. REPORT 1972, supra note 2, at 65
app.; CONF. REPORT 1971, supra note 2, at 53 app.
4. See CONF. REPORT 1977, supra note 2, at 46; CONF. REPORT 1975, supra note 2, at

34.
5. See CONF. REPORT 1970, supra note 2, at 131 app.
6. See ANNUAL REPORT 1982, supra note 2, at 9 app.; ANNUAL REPORT 1981, supra note
2, at 4 app.; ANNUAL REPORT 1980, supra note 2, at 7 app.; ANNUAL REPORT 1979, supra
note 2, at 3 app.; ANNUAL REPORT 1978, supra note 2, at 2 app.; CONF. REPORT 1978, supra
note 2, at 50 app.; CONF. REPORT 1972, supra note 2, at 65 app.; CONF. REPORT 1971, supra
note 2, at 53 app.; CONF. REPORT 1970, supra note 2, at 131 app.
7. See ANNUAL REPORT 1983, supra note 2, at 9 app. F; CONF. REPORT 1978, supra note
2, at 46; CONF. REPORT 1975, supra note 2, at 34; CONF. REPORT 1974, supra note 2, at 85
app.

8. See

CONF. REPORT

1977, supra note 2, at 46;

CONF. REPORT

1973, supra note 2, at

34.
9.

Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,

dissenting).
10. Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 31

HASTINGS

LJ.427, 429 (1986).
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largely depends.'"11 The legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart wrote of
dissents: "A supreme tribunal has the last word in saying what the
law is and, when it has said it, the statement that the court was
'wrong' has no consequences within the system: no one's rights or
duties are thereby altered. ' 12 Not all writers share these critical
views. In fact, such criticism does not withstand analysis.
In defense of dissents, one writer has characterized the dissenting opinion as a form of civil disobedience which has a variety
of important consequences.1 3 Among those consequences, the dissent provides "hope of a future remedy for a present wrong.' '14
Others agree that an important, perhaps primary, objective of a
dissenting opinion is "the remedy of a perceived wrong." 5
Phrased differently, it has been labeled a "corrective." 10
It has also been said that the most enduring dissents are those
in which the authors speak as "prophets with honor;"17 -those
that reveal "the perceived congruence between the Constitution
and the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society,' "18 those that "soar with passion and ring
with rhetoric," and those that seek to "sow seeds for future
harvest." 19
Justice William J. Brennan has described five types of dissents:
the corrective; the damage control mechanism; the guide to lower
courts, state courts, and litigants; the seed for future consideration, and; the persistent reminder of an unbending position. 20
Each of these types of dissent plays a critical role in our civil and
criminal justice systems. It is, however, the rare judge who is able
to blend elements of each type into a single persuasive opinion.
Judge Jasen has mastered that task.
This multi-faceted dissent demonstrates that the issues have
been thoroughly argued, that the merits have been debated, and
11.

L.

HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958).
H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138 (1961).
Campbell, The Spirit of Dissent, 66 JUDICATURE 304, 306 (1983).
Id. at 307.
Id. at 309.
Brennan, supra note 10, at 430.
A. BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR: GREAT DISSENTS AND DISSENTERS IN THE SUPREME COURT (1974).
18. Brennan, supra note 10, at 431 (quoting Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
19. Id. at 431.
20. Brennan, supra note 10, at 430-36.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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that the positions of each side have been fully considered. It insures that the merits of each position have been wrung from the
case and that each view is laid bare and held up for review and
further debate by other courts, the bar, and the public. It is at
once an internal mechanism that keeps the majority in check 1
and a public declaration that insures an open system of justice. It
fosters public confidence in a system in which all views are subject
to public scrutiny and criticism.
The dissent is also a statement of personal conviction-a
voice crying in the darkness to be heard and recognized. According to Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes, "A dissent . . .is an
appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a
future day."'22 The dissent is a statement of a view that has been
rejected by some and, therefore, seeks acceptance by future generations. As Justice Benjamin Cardozo so eloquently stated:
The voice of the majority may be that of force triumphant, content with the
plaudits of the hour, and recking little of the morrow. The dissenter speaks
to the future, and his voice is pitched to a key that will carry through the
years. Read some of the great dissents ... and feel after the cooling time of
the better part of a century, the glow and fire of a faith that was content to
bide its hour. The prophet and martyr do not see the hooting throng. Their
eyes are fixed on the eternities.2 3

Nevertheless, some maintain that conflicting views ought to
be suppressed.2 4 I submit, however, that unanimity for the sake of
unanimity and at the expense of honestly held conflicting opinions
is anathema to our system of an open and free society. It is a deception upon the public to quash a differing view and deliver an
opinion represented as unanimous. Chief Justice Hughes stated
the principle well:
[U]nanimity which is merely formal, which is recorded at the expense of

strong, conflicting views, is not desirable in a court of last resort, whatever
may be the effect upon public opinion .... This is so because what must

ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the character and independence of the judges. They are not there simply to decide cases, but to
decide them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be re21.

As Karl Llewellyn once said, the dissenter "rides herd on the majority." K. LLEw-

ELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26 (1960).
22. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
23. B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER EsSAYS AND ADDRESSES 36 (1931).
24. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; L. HAND,THE BiLL OF RIGHTS 72
(1958); H. HART,THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138 (1961).
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grettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that their independence
should be maintained and recognized than that unanimity should be secured
through its sacrifice."

Referring to the old practice of the Kings Bench in England,
Thomas Jefferson warned of the dangers of suppressing a minority view: "An opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who
sophisticates the law to his own mind, by the turn of his own reasoning.12 6 Surely this is not what our system of law seeks or ought
to seek. As Justice Douglas once wrote, "It is the right of dissent,
not the right or duty to conform, which gives dignity, worth and
' 27
individuality to man.
Fortunately, during the last twenty years, the New York
Court of Appeals has been blessed with such able chief judges as
Desmond, Fuld, Breitel, Cooke, and Wachtler who have not
sought to suppress firmly held dissenting views. Indeed, each has
at times been an active dissenter in his own right. This philosophy
of encouraging debate is certainly responsible, at least in part, for
the high regard in which opinions of the court of appeals are held
and for the court being, as Judge Jasen has often called it, the
preeminent state court in the country.
The words and ideas of Jefferson, Hughes, Douglas, Brennan,
and Cardozo argue forcefully in favor of dissents. The effectiveness of the dissenting opinion in exposing a perceived wrong and
bringing about corrective action is nowhere better demonstrated
than by the dissenting opinions of Judge Jasen.
Unless compelled by statute, stare decisis, or constitutional restraints, Judge Jasen refused to permit substantial injustice to go
without remedy because of overly technical interpretations of the
court's jurisdictional limitations. For example, in People v. Mackell,28 the court refused to review a determination of the appellate
division simply because that court stated in its order that its decision was "on the law and the facts." If the order had recited that
the decision was "on the law," the court of appeals would have
25. C. HUGHES, supra note 22, at 67-68.
26. Letter from John Marshall to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), quoted in Brennan,
supra note 10, at 433.
27. W. DOUGLAS, AMERICA CHALLENGED 4-5 (1960).
28. 40 N.Y.2d 59, 351 N.E.2d 684, 386 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1976).
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reviewed it.
Judge Jasen chastised the court for holding that "the use of
these three technical words divests the court of jurisdiction to review the merits." 9 Using pointed language, Judge Jasen warned
of the long-term dangers of the majority's view: "[T]he majority's
decision threatens the efficacy and vitality of the appellate process
itself since the court will now honor recitals in appellate division
orders designed to insulate law decisions from further review." 30
Judge Jasen courageously noted that the defendants involved were
public officials who ought not to escape punishment on a "technicality totally unsupported by the record." '
The cry was heard. In 1979, the legislature amended the statute to permit the court of appeals to look behind the words of an
appellate division order to determine for itself whether a question
of law was involved and could be reviewed.32
In People v. Linzy, 3 the court of appeals struggled with the
statutory requirement that a rape victim's testimony concerning
the identity of her assailant must be corroborated. The majority
criticized the rule but nevertheless applied it rigidly and reversed
the defendant's conviction, paying only passing attention to arguably significant corroborative evidence.
Judge Jasen dissented, boldly calling for "outright repeal of
all corroboration requirements in sex cases." 34 Judge Jasen railed
at the injustice of a system that relies on existing safeguards to
protect the rights of persons accused of murder, robbery, and
burglary but that imposes a unique and difficult corroboration requirement where a person is accused of rape. This dissent implicitly rejected the suggestion in the corroboration rule that the testimony of sex crime victims, usually women, is inherently suspect
and not worthy of belief in the absence of independent corroborating evidence. Judge Jasen argued for a relaxed construction of the corroboration rule. He then described in some detail
the significant corroborating evidence offered by the prosecution
29.
30.
31.
32.
ch. 651,
33.
34.

Id. at 66, 351 N.E.2d at 688, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
Id.
Id.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.90 (McKinney 1983), amended by Act ofJuly 11, 1979,
§ 1, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1256.
31 N.Y.2d 99, 286 N.E.2d 440, 335 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1972).
Id. at 107, 286 N.E.2d at 445, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
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and voted to affirm.
In 1974, Judge Jasen's message and similar pleas from others
became law. The legislature amended section 130.16 of the New
York Penal Law to eliminate the corroboration requirement in
nearly all sex crimes cases. Approving the new legislation, Governor Malcom Wilson expressed what Judge Jasen had implied two
years before:
Furthermore, the implicit suggestion in the corroboration rule that the
testimony of women, who are most often complainants in sex cases, is inherently suspect and should not be trusted without the support of the independent evidence, is without justification and contrary to our strong belief in
the principle of complete equality for women in our society.35

In a case that came to the court of appeals in 1971, the court
reversed an appellate division decision confirming a determination
of the superintendent of the New York State Police that a police
officer should be dismissed from service for shoplifting."0 Judge
Breitel dissented in an opinion in which Judge Jasen concurred.
The dissent pointed out the practical and constitutional limits on
the court's power to judge the credibility of witnesses and review
factual questions. It urged judicial restraint and deference to the
agency's internal decision-making procedures.
This was a principle like so many others that Judge Jasen refused to abandon. He reaffirmed his commitment to it two months
later in his dissent in Picconi v. Lowery, 7 and two months after that
in Short v. Looney. 8 Judge Jasen humbly acknowledged that supervisory personnel, not the courts, are best qualified to monitor and
discipline employees and called for an end to de novo type judicial
review of sanctions and penalties imposed by governmental agencies on their workers.
Finally, in Pell v. Board of Education,"9 the court heeded Judge
Jasen's call for corrective action. The court embraced the reasoning of his dissents, unanimously overturned its prior line of decisions, and adopted a new position. The new position mirrored
that propounded by Judge Jasen over the years. In fact, three of
35.
dence,
36.
37.
38.
39.

Governor's Memoranda-Approval of Bills-Sex Offenses-Corroborating Evi1974 N.Y. Laws 2077, 2078.
Halloran v. Kirwan, 28 N.Y.2d 689, 269 N.E.2d 403, 320 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1971).
28 N.Y.2d 962, 272 N.E.2d 77, 323 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1971).
29 N.Y.2d 578, 272 N.E.2d 892, 324 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1971).
34 N.Y.2d 222, 313 N.E.2d 321, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1974).
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Judge Jasen's dissenting opinions were cited in support of the Pell
decision.
Judge Jasen appealed for corrective action once again in his
dissent in People v. Griffin.40 In that case, the court held improper
the identification by a witness of a composite sketch prepared by a
third party from a description given by the witness. Judge Jasen
argued that the witness was merely testifying to her previous identification as permitted by then section 393-b of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure. He pointed out that identification of
a sketch prepared shortly after a crime from the witness' own
description "eliminates the danger present in other extrajudicial
identifications . . . that the person or photograph selected was

suggested to the witness by others present at the identification." 41
Judge Jasen's foresight and reasoning did not go unnoticed.
In its proposed code of evidence, the law revision commission, citing the Griffin dissent, criticized the majority rule as "unwarranted" and recommended adoption of a more liberal identification rule.42
Similarly, in his dissent in Caprarav. Chrysler Corp.,43 Judge
Jasen disagreed with the majority's holding that evidence of a
post-accident design change could be admitted in evidence to
prove a manufacturing defect. The dissent, which was co-authored with Judges Jones and Meyer, focused on three issues. It
warned of the dangers of weakening the policy of excluding such
evidence in order to avoid deterring manufacturers from taking
subsequent remedial measures." It argued that such evidence has
no relevance to the issue whether a product was defective at the
time of manufacture. 45 The dissent also discussed at length the
extremely prejudicial nature of such evidence.46
Judge Jasen pointed out with characteristic clarity and common sense that jurors "can hardly be expected to look beyond the
admission which they will believe to be implicit in defendant's
having made a design change. .

.

. To admit evidence of subse-

40. 29 N.Y.2d 91, 272 N.E.2d 477, 323 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1971).
41. Id. at 95, 272 N.E.2d at 480, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
42.

CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 803 comment at 185 (Proposed

Draft 1982) (N. Y. S. Law Revision Comm'n) [hereinafter CODE OF EVIDENCE].
43. 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
44. Id. at 131-32, 417 N.E.2d at 554, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 259-60.
45. Id. at 130, 417 N.E.2d at 523, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
46. Id. at 135, 417 N.E.2d at 556, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
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quent change on a less limited basis in strict liability cases generally is to make every manufacturer the insurer of the safety of his
liabilproduct." This would be "tantamount to imposing absolute
47
ity on manufacturers for all product-related injuries.1

The law revision commission agreed and has proposed the
following rule for "subsequent remedial measures":
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event, or to prove a defect in a product. Evidence of subsequent measures may, however, be admissible when offered to impeach or as
proof on such issues, if 48
controverted, as ownership, control or feasibility of
precautionary measures.

The commission, citing Judge Jasen's dissent in Caprara, commented that
This section rejects the holding in the Caprara decision. In the Commission's opinion, no distinction between strict products liability actions and
negligence actions justifies the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in strict products liability actions . .

.

.It is to be noted that the

section is consistent
with the trend of recent cases prohibiting the admission
49
of such evidence.

Judge Jasen's protest also was embraced by the Second Circuit in Cann v. Ford Motor Co. 50 That court, citing Judge Jasen's
Capraradissent, rejected plaintiff's argument that evidence of subsequent remedial measures should be admissible in strict products
liability actions under section 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court noted, as had Judge Jasen, that the rule of exclusion "represents a common sense recognition that people are
loath to take actions which increase the risk of losing a lawsuit." 51
The Caprara dissent exemplifies the utility of a dissenting
opinion. The opinion framed the issues with precision and articulated an opposing view in a persuasive manner. This dissent provided a blueprint for the Second Circuit in rejecting the Caprara
majority view and for the law revision commission in demanding
47. Id. at 135, 417 N.E.2d at 556, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 262 (quoting Robinson v. ReedPrentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 481, 403 N.E.2d 440, 444, 426
N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (1980).

supra note 42, § 407.

48.

CODE OF EVIDENCE,

49.
50.
51.

Id., comment at 59-60.
658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id. at 60.
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corrective legislative action.
A question of statewide constitutional import arose in 1970 in
Simonson v. Cahn52 when the court was called upon to examine the
role a grand jury should play in our criminal justice system. The
court, in a four-two decision, held that a defendant could not
waive indictment by a grand jury and proceed to trial on a district
attorney's information.
Judge Jasen disagreed with the majority's paternalistic approach. In his dissent, he noted that as far back as 1681 the grand
jury has been viewed as a protection for the individual, not for the
public.53 Noting that similar individual constitutional rights have
been held waivable, he argued: "It is totally unreasonable to hold
that an accused may not knowingly and intelligently waive a rule
which was made for his own protection.""M
After legislative action and submission of the question for
statewide vote, article 1, section 6 of the New York State Constitution was amended as of January 1, 1974, and Judge Jasen's dissenting position became law.
The foresight demonstrated by Judge Jasen in Simonson v.
Cahn is becoming even more evident today as the grand jury system comes under severe criticism. Chief Judge Wachtler aptly
summarized the system's efficacy when recently remarked that a
prosecutor could obtain an indictment against a ham sandwich if
he chose to.
As Judge Jasen foresaw sixteen years ago, it would be a curious rule indeed if a defendant were not allowed to waive a requirement designed solely for his protection which, in effect, provides almost no protection at all. Fortunately, Judge Jasen had the
courage to bring the problem to light so that corrective action
could be taken.
Judge Jasen's dissents have been embraced by the public as
well as the judiciary and legislature. One dissenting opinion that
has gained great notoriety is that written in People v. Rogers.55 In
Rogers, a robbery suspect was arrested and given Miranda warnings both at the time of his arrest and again at police headquarters. He then informed the police that he was represented by
52. 27 N.Y.2d 1, 261 N.E.2d 246, 313 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1970).
53. Id. at 6-7, 261 N.E.2d at 249-50, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 101-03.
54. Id. at 7, 261 N.E.2d at 250, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
55. 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

counsel on an unrelated charge but was willing to speak with police, which he did. Defense counsel called later and directed the
police to cease questioning. The police asked no further questions
regarding the robbery but spoke with the defendant about unrelated matters. After all questioning ceased, the defendant uttered
an inculpatory statement which he later sought to suppress.
The court, in a five-two opinion, suppressed the statement,
holding that a defendant represented by counsel on a pending
matter cannot be questioned on an unrelated matter even if he
agreed, in the absence of counsel, to such questioning.
Judge Jasen vehemently disagreed with the majority's view of
New York's right to counsel rule vis-a-vis the rights and duties of
the state to investigate and prosecute criminal conduct. After an
enlightened discussion of the constitutional and practical bases for
his position, Judge Jasen acknowledged the importance of fostering and retaining the respect of "the average citizen" in our criminal justice system. He wrote:
To require a police officer to prevent a prisoner from volunteering a
statement, or to prevent the officer from divulging statements spontaneously
made to him would stretch the comprehension of the average citizen to the
breaking point. Our decisions must appear to be rational, fair as well as practical, if the courts are to retain the respect of the people. The admonition of
Justice Cardozo is particularly appropriate under these circumstances-'J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament.' (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122.)16

Judge Jasen's scholarly yet common sense approach to the
Rogers case and his balanced sensitivity to both defendants and the
police inspired a book titled Outrage.5 The book portrays a fictional crime and trial centered around the Rogers decision and,
more particularly, Judge Jasen's dissent. The book was adapted
into a play which opened in Washington, D.C., in December
1982. It later became a made-for-television movie which was
shown nationally in March 1986.
The effect of Judge Jasen's dissent in Rogers, of course, cannot be measured with certainty.. However, this author could find
no jurisdiction, state or federal, that has adopted the Rogers rule.
56. Id. at 178, 397 N.E.2d at 716, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (quoting People v. Kaye, 25
N.Y.2d 139, 145, 250 N.E.2d 329, 332, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (1969)).
57. H.

DENKER, OUTRAGE

(1982).
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To the contrary, it appears that every jurisdiction that has considered the issue has agreed with Judge Jasen's dissenting view. 58
Perhaps, without the enlightened dissenting opinion of Judge
Jasen, other jurisdictions may have been less cautious.
During his eighteen years at the court of appeals, Judge Jasen
did not shirk his duty to disagree when constitutional guarantees
or matters of public policy were at stake. In his remarks to the
court upon his retirement, Judge Jasen expressed deep gratitude
for having had the "opportunity to discharge [his] constitutional
oath and voice [his] opinion when convinced that the fundamental
law of our Constitution required a given result." 59 When he
voiced those opinions, others, including the United States Supreme Court, listened and were moved to act.
The Supreme Court recently reversed a decision of the New
York Court of Appeals that had upheld a statute prohibiting the
sale of alcoholic beverages by distillers to wholesalers except in
accordance with a price schedule filed with the state liquor authority. 0 The Supreme Court, like Judge Jasen, saw that the practical effect of the New York statute would be to force distillers to
abandon promotional allowances in order to comply with lowest
price laws in New York and elsewhere, thereby impermissibly burdening interstate commerce. The statute was held unconstitutional, assuring a more open market for free trade and its attendant benefits to the consuming public.
Perhaps the most forceful of Judge Jasen's dissenting opinions
are those that deal with pornography and the protection of chil58. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Supreme Court made clear that
under the federal Constitution, a defendant could waive his right to counsel without an
attorney being present. See also Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
The Rogers decision has been expressly rejected in the following states: Florida (Miller
v. State, 403 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Loftan v. State, 471 So. 2d 665 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981)); New Hampshire (State v. Lamb, 125 N.H. 495, 484 A.2d 1074
(1984)); New Jersey (State v. Porter, 210 N.J. Super. 383, 510 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986)); Oregon (State v. Sparklin, 296 Or. 85, 672 P.2d 1182 (1983)); Texas
(Dunn v. State, 696 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1478
(1986)); and West Virginia (State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659, 669 (W. Va. 1980) ("Apparently only one court [New York Court of Appeals] has held that a defendant's retention of
counsel on an unrelated charge forecloses the State from undertaking interrogation of the
defendant on a separate charge without notice to his counsel.")). See also Dillon, The Case
for Reversing "The Rogers Rule" on the Right to Counsel, N.Y. ST. B.J., July, 1986, at 36.
59. 66 N.Y.2d x (1985).
60. Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 106 S. Ct. 2080
(1986), rev'g 64 N.Y.2d 479 (1985).
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dren. Two of those dissents were ultimately embraced by the Supreme Court and have become the law of the land.
In People v. Ferber,61 the court of appeals struck down a statute prohibiting promotion of a sexual performance by a child.
The majority was primarily concerned with the potential chilling
effect the statute might have on various first amendment rights.
Judge Jasen, however, recognized that the statute was not
designed primarily to restrict the type of film or literature the
public could view. He viewed the case as one primarily concerned
with a state's interest in protecting children from "the severe
emotional and psychological damage . . . which will result from
this base and degrading sexual exploitation .... ,,63 Judge Jasen
argued that, on balance, the slight speculative burden on genuine
first amendment rights was insufficient to prevent the state from
passing legislation to protect children from sexual abuse.
The Supreme Court reversed, without a single dissent. The
Court agreed with Judge Jasen that "the States are entitled to
greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of
children."'"
By recognizing the larger and more serious implications of
the Ferber case and by having the courage to take a bold stand on
the issues it involved, Judge Jasen, and ultimately the Supreme
Court, struck an appropriate balance between true first amendment rights and the compelling interest of a state in protecting its
children.
In a more recent case, People v. P.J. Video, Inc.,15 the court of
appeals held that information submitted by police to establish
probable cause for seizing pornographic movies was inadequate.
The information submitted consisted of five affidavits of a police
officer who viewed the films and described in graphic detail various acts of oral and anal sodomy, incestuous intercourse, and
onanism. The majority held that there is a "higher standard" for
evaluating a warrant to seize books and films rather than drugs
61.

52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 747

(1982).
62.
63.

N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.15 (McKinney 1980).
52 N.Y.2d 674, 681, 422 N.E.2d 523, 527, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (1981) Uasen,

J., dissenting), rev'd, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)..
64.
6.5.

(1986).

458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
65-N.Y.2d 566, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1610
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JUDGE MATTHEW J. JASEN

and weapons. Applying this "higher standard," it found that there
was no probable cause for the search.
Judge Jasen dissented. As is his trademark, he framed the issue as he saw it at the outset of his opinion: "[W]hat is 'before us is
not whether the defendants are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
• . .but rather, simply whether the magistrate, in issuing the warrant to seize the movies, had probable cause to believe that they
were obscene."66 He acknowledged the thorough description of
both the content and character of the films.6 7 In doing so, Judge
Jasen drew a blueprint upon which a higher tribunal could correct
the majority's perceived error.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in a sixthree decision. Like Judge Jasen, the Court rejected the idea of
a "higher standard" and applied the general probable cause standard of review to the affidavits presented in support of the warrant application. The Court held that it is "clear beyond peradventure that the warrant was supported by probable cause.''69
The Court then took the unusual step of quoting verbatim a
substantial portion of Judge Jasen's dissenting opinion"0 and, following that, said: "We believe that the analysis and conclusion expressed by [Judge Jasen] are completely consistent with our statement in Gates that 'probable cause requires only a probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of
such activity.' ,71
While it is often difficult to assess the impact of a dissenting
opinion, there can be little doubt that Judge Jasen's dissent in People v. P.J. Video, Inc. carried significant persuasive influence with
the majority at the Supreme Court.
These are but a few of many examples of Judge Jasen's wisdom, courage, and foresight as expressed in dissent. They not
only speak volumes as to the ability and integrity of the man, they
also forcefully demonstrate the persuasive influence a well reasoned and skillfully crafted dissenting opinion can have on the dis66. Id. at 573, 483 N.E.2d at 1125, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
67. So convinced of the correctness of his position was Judge Jasen that he annexed as
an appendix to the dissent copies of the affidavits submitted by the police in support of the
warrant application.
68. 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986).
69. Id. at 1610.
70. Id. at 1616.
71. Id.
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senter's own court, higher courts, legislative bodies, scholars, and
the public.
-MICHAEL B. POWERS, EsQ.
PHILLIPS, LYTLE, HITCHCOCK, BLAINE & HUBER

